[Go-essp-tech] [esg-node-dev] Re: Question on P2P and signing of registry docs

Gavin M. Bell gavin at llnl.gov
Wed Jun 1 15:57:45 MDT 2011


 Hi Luca,

Just as we do now... at installation you have to setup your certs.  In
the installation you generate a CSR... as with everything public key
crypto, you send in your CSR get it signed and get back your cert and
then install the cert (esg-node --install-keypair).  Done.
All CSRs go to the *single* CA for the ESGF network, which is a
subordinate CA for a "well-known-CA".  And Done. :-).

This has the benefit of limiting the litany of CA Certs we have now,
that is over-running the poorly designed Safari browser.
If *everybody's* is special -> nobody is special.  Right now the
certificate scenario we currently have is not tenable. IMHO

This is, in a nutshell, the best long term solution... which will bear
other fruit as well...
I think the underlying issues that people are really concerned with
namely sovereignty and partitioning can be addressed elsewhere.

more later. :-)

On 6/1/11 10:38 AM, Estanislao Gonzalez wrote:
> Hi Gavin,
>
> to go back a little. How is SSL going to work in the p2p configuration?
> You said that PCMDI will sign certificate request right? But that will
> imply users will have to be confronted with a "do you trust this CA?"
> pop up when accesing th UI via SSL, won't it? Or is the plan to get a
> CA Verisign certificate for PCMDI? (Is that possible?)
>
> In any case Phil wasn't at the telco, so not sure this got into the
> mails...
>
> Thanks,
> Estani
>
> Am 01.06.2011 19:34, schrieb Gavin M. Bell:
>> Hey Phil,
>>
>> Indeed this was on my mind as well... You are correct signing is
>> important and should be done.  We can start looking into the
>> mechanics of setting up XMLSec as you suggested.  With respect to
>> security, can we already use the certificate and key present on the
>> node (indeed, I think we should be able to), right?  I didn't look at
>> XMLSec, I briefly was looking at installing GPG's library, or a Java
>> crypto library implementation to sign all payloads... using the
>> nodes' cert/key.  But it begs the question...
>>
>> Question, why isn't ssl enough?  With an SSL connection don't you get
>> authentication for "free", which is all we need. If we trust who it
>> is coming from, can't we thus trust the information?
>>
>> We can really get gnarly and lock the whole mesh network down and put
>> it on a VPN.... but how much is too much?
>>
>> What are your thoughts?
>>
>> On 6/1/11 5:07 AM, philip.kershaw at stfc.ac.uk wrote:
>>> Hi Gavin,
>>>
>>> I wanted to be on the call yesterday but unfortunately I've been away at
>>> another meeting.  Hello from Pisa :)
>>>
>>> One thing I wanted to raise in the context of the P2P architecture was the
>>> registry interface, and the need to digitally sign registry documents.
>>> This is something that we talked about at the ESGF meeting in Asheville.
>>> To restate the problem, any peer can pass to another peer a registry
>>> document containing registry information for itself and for other peers
>>> that it has communicated with.  Have I got that right?
>>>
>>> The recipient of such a document might accept the registry information
>>> about the sender but how can it verify the registry information contained
>>> in the document that comes from other peers?  The only way to do this is
>>> for each peer to digitally sign its registry information.  That way, on
>>> receipt of such information, a peer can verify that all the information
>>> has come from the expected sources and has not been tampered with.  This
>>> is a must for a production system.  It would be a straightforward change
>>> to add XMLSec code to sign content.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Phil
>>>
>>> On 31/05/2011 16:01, "Cinquini, Luca (3880)" <Luca.Cinquini at jpl.nasa.gov>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>> 	here's the agenda for today's conf call:
>>>> http://www.esgf.org/wiki/EsgfCmip5Meetings
>>>>
>>>> And some background documentation on the p2p Node system:
>>>>
>>>> http://www.esgf.org/wiki/ESGF_Index
>>>>
>>>> thanks, Luca
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> GO-ESSP-TECH mailing list
>>>> GO-ESSP-TECH at ucar.edu
>>>> http://mailman.ucar.edu/mailman/listinfo/go-essp-tech
>>
>> -- 
>> Gavin M. Bell
>> Lawrence Livermore National Labs
>> --
>>
>>  "Never mistake a clear view for a short distance."
>>        	       -Paul Saffo
>>
>> (GPG Key - http://rainbow.llnl.gov/dist/keys/gavin.asc)
>>
>>  A796 CE39 9C31 68A4 52A7  1F6B 66B7 B250 21D5 6D3E
>
>
> -- 
> Estanislao Gonzalez
>
> Max-Planck-Institut für Meteorologie (MPI-M)
> Deutsches Klimarechenzentrum (DKRZ) - German Climate Computing Centre
> Room 108 - Bundesstrasse 45a, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany
>
> Phone:   +49 (40) 46 00 94-126
> E-Mail:  gonzalez at dkrz.de 

-- 
Gavin M. Bell
Lawrence Livermore National Labs
--

 "Never mistake a clear view for a short distance."
       	       -Paul Saffo

(GPG Key - http://rainbow.llnl.gov/dist/keys/gavin.asc)

 A796 CE39 9C31 68A4 52A7  1F6B 66B7 B250 21D5 6D3E

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://mailman.ucar.edu/pipermail/go-essp-tech/attachments/20110601/34201d06/attachment-0001.html 


More information about the GO-ESSP-TECH mailing list