[Go-essp-tech] Call for CA and OpenID Trust root Certificates

martin.juckes at stfc.ac.uk martin.juckes at stfc.ac.uk
Fri Sep 10 03:28:42 MDT 2010


Hi Stephen,

 

I don't think you can put the problem entirely in the GO-ESSP Pis court: esgf.org contributes to the fragmentation because it makes no attempt to say what ESGF is ("ESGF is a non-profit organization formed by participates in the GO-ESSP collaboration to bring their knowledge and experience to bear on critical Earth System federations in the dissemination of climate data and related products" - from the PCMDI page)  or link to associated web-sites.  Esgf.org might be good as an idea, but as a web site it still has a lot of problems.

 

It would be useful to have a clear set of requirements. I get the impression from Phil that https is more or less essential. The other requirement appears to be the people can put stuff there: can we get a bit clearer on these requirements? 

 

Cheers,

Martin

 

 

From: go-essp-tech-bounces at ucar.edu [mailto:go-essp-tech-bounces at ucar.edu] On Behalf Of stephen.pascoe at stfc.ac.uk
Sent: 10 September 2010 10:00
To: asim at lbl.gov; gavin at llnl.gov
Cc: Luca.Cinquini at jpl.nasa.gov; go-essp-tech at ucar.edu
Subject: Re: [Go-essp-tech] Call for CA and OpenID Trust root Certificates

 

I know the sudden emergence of esgf.org must be disconcerting to some who weren't directly involved in it's inception; and I agree that governance is a piece of the puzzle we critically need to sort out.  The balls in GO-ESSP PIs there.

 

However, I just want to stress that the status quo is unsustainable and a huge barrier to adoption: information on the ESGF software is fragmented throughout a handful of institutional websites with very little organisation or cross-linking.  I feel the only solution is to manage top-level information from an institution-neutral site, which esgf.org is.

 

On the specific point of managing trustroots.  I'm not sure why reading of the trustroots over HTTP would be a problem.  Updating them obviously has to be controlled.  Esgf.org has the technical infrastructure through it's git repository which I regularly write to using an ssh key pair.  Governance could also be enforced by having separate update and master branches a master branches.  I'm sure Gavin could put together a hook to automatically build the keystore.

 

However, if ANL are working on an alternative that's great but I think it should be at least *linked* from esgf.org.

 

Cheers,

Stephen.

 

---

Stephen Pascoe  +44 (0)1235 445980

British Atmospheric Data Centre

Rutherford Appleton Laboratory

 

 

________________________________

From: go-essp-tech-bounces at ucar.edu [mailto:go-essp-tech-bounces at ucar.edu] On Behalf Of Alex Sim
Sent: 09 September 2010 19:11
To: Gavin M. Bell
Cc: Cinquini, Luca (3880); go-essp-tech at ucar.edu
Subject: Re: [Go-essp-tech] Call for CA and OpenID Trust root Certificates

I somewhat agree with Rachana that hosting them on esgf.org is not a problem but we need some kind of governance on the info, before making them available on the web. This includes more of policy issues as well. One example is how a gateway is decided to be trusted and included in the trusted list, as anyone can download and install an ESG gateway/MyProxy server and generate a CA.




-- Alex


On 9/9/10 10:51 AM, Gavin M. Bell wrote: 

Hi Rachana, 

If we are looking for a place to house this information then, I agree with Luca, that esgf.org is available and probably the most amenable site for doing so.  At the moment the issue is that Neill would like the information hosted behind an https site 'somewhere', under that requirement - esgf.org is as good a place as any, IMHO.  Also, we can host that information from another server here at LLNL, I am thinking the distribution machine here.  In the context of esgf, one scenario is that, we treat the key storage, management and information (web page) in the same way we treat the projects hosted there.  This makes it easy to maintain, etc..

Neill, no worries, we can find a place for you (your stuff... our certs).  I guess what would be good to know is, how 'on fire' is this request?  I can make the spare cycles to make this happen for you, but manage my expectations so I can give this the priority is requires.  Is there a due date you have in mind?


On 9/9/10 7:14 AM, Rachana Ananthakrishnan wrote: 

Hi Luca,
 
This is the second time this has been referenced on this mailing list
- but there has not been any information on how this is governed, or
how to get access to the site? The site itself doesn't provide much
information on the intended purpose either. I am fine hosting it
there, provided we agree on some process for maintaining these, and
understand ownership when things are moved there.
 
Thanks,
Rachana
 
On Sep 9, 2010, at 9:07 AM, Cinquini, Luca (3880) wrote:
 

	Hi Neill,
	may I suggest again that this information be placed somewhere in
	esgf.org ?
	Thxs, luca
	 
	 
	 
	 
	On Sep 9, 2010, at 8:01 AM, "neillm at mcs.anl.gov" <mailto:neillm at mcs.anl.gov> 
	<neillm at mcs.anl.gov> <mailto:neillm at mcs.anl.gov>  wrote:
	 

		Hello Estani,
		 
		I somehow missed your latest, my apologies.  I'll have those
		integrated as well as Stephen's shortly.
		 
		We are working on have a central place to store these, but it's not
		resolved yet.
		 
		The requirement is that it be HTTPS accessible.  If someone has
		access to something like that, I'm all for moving the page there.
		The document needs to be updated with each certificate that changes
		and also the truststore needs to be regenerated, so I don't think
		public FTP is the best option.
		 
		I do agree that a UofC Wiki is not the ideal final resting place
		for this information though.
		 
		-Neill.
		 
		----- Original Message -----
		From: "Estanislao Gonzalez" <estanislao.gonzalez at zmaw.de> <mailto:estanislao.gonzalez at zmaw.de> 
		To: "stephen pascoe" <stephen.pascoe at stfc.ac.uk> <mailto:stephen.pascoe at stfc.ac.uk> 
		Cc: neillm at mcs.anl.gov, go-essp-tech at ucar.edu, "philip kershaw" <philip.kershaw at stfc.ac.uk
		Sent: Thursday, September 9, 2010 8:35:27 AM GMT -06:00 US/Canada
		Central
		Subject: Re: [Go-essp-tech] Call for CA and OpenID Trust root
		Certificates
		 
		Hi all,
		 
		I see the trusted certificates are quiet old. I've already changed
		them
		as requested so that the naming scheme would be more ESG-conform, but
		the certificates are still the older ones.
		 
		Would it be possible to upload the certificates somewhere? maybe a
		pub ftp?
		That way we could just upload the certificates if the were changed.
		We
		could later on delete the ones we don't require.
		 
		 
		Thanks,
		Estani
		 
		stephen.pascoe at stfc.ac.uk wrote:

			Hi Neil,
			 
			Updating our trustroots using your wiki page below I notice that the
			esg-truststore.ks file is missing 2 of our certificates that are
			in the
			tarball esg_trusted_certificates-08-24-2010.tar.gz.  These are
			cf22df3a.0 and ece35fd4.0
			 
			I can guess how this happened.  Phil provided PEM files containing
			both
			the certificate text and BEGIN CERTIFICATE sections.  I've noticed
			keytool fails unless PEM files only contain the BEGIN CERTIFICATE
			block.
			 
			Those using esg-truststore.ks need to import the certificates into
			the
			keystore in order for it to work with BADC.  One possible recipe is:
			 
			$ sed -n '/BEGIN CERT/,/END CERT/ p' esg_trusted_certificates/
			cf22df3a.0
			 

				cf22df3a_bare.0
				 

			$ keytool -import -keystore esg-truststore.ts -alias cf22df3a -file
			cf22df3a_bare.0
			$ sed -n '/BEGIN CERT/,/END CERT/ p' esg_trusted_certificates/
			ece35fd4.0
			 

				ece35fd4_bare.0
				 

			$ keytool -import -keystore esg-truststore.ts -alias ece35fd4 -file
			ece35fd4_bare.0
			 
			I hope this can be reflected in esg-truststore.ks soon.
			 
			Cheers,
			Stephen.
			 
			---
			Stephen Pascoe  +44 (0)1235 445980
			British Atmospheric Data Centre
			Rutherford Appleton Laboratory
			 
			-----Original Message-----
			From: go-essp-tech-bounces at ucar.edu
			[mailto:go-essp-tech-bounces at ucar.edu] On Behalf Of neillm at mcs.anl.gov
			Sent: 17 August 2010 22:42
			To: go-essp-tech at ucar.edu
			Subject: Re: [Go-essp-tech] Call for CA and OpenID Trust root
			Certificates
			 
			Hello,
			 
			According to the document here:
			 
			http://*www.*ci.uchicago.edu/wiki/bin/view/ESGProject/ESGFederationTrustRo
			ots
			 
			PCMDI, NCAR and ORNL still need to update their DNs to something
			more
			official.  This is a CMIP5 blocker as far as I know.
			 
			-Neill.
			 
			----- Original Message -----
			From: "Neill Miller" <neillm at mcs.anl.gov> <mailto:neillm at mcs.anl.gov> 
			To: go-essp-tech at ucar.edu
			Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2010 11:30:30 AM GMT -06:00 US/Canada
			Central
			Subject: Re: [Go-essp-tech] Call for CA and OpenID Trust root
			Certificates
			 
			Hello,
			 
			Has anyone made any progress on generating new CA certificates
			without
			default simpleCA DNs?  Someone has already sent me new
			certificates for
			their site, so aside from that of course.  Please let me know, or
			send
			me updated certs and I'll get them online as soon as I can.
			 
			thanks,
			-Neill.
			 
			----- Original Message -----
			From: "Neill Miller" <neillm at mcs.anl.gov> <mailto:neillm at mcs.anl.gov> 
			To: asim at lbl.gov
			Cc: go-essp-tech at ucar.edu
			Sent: Friday, August 6, 2010 11:24:04 AM GMT -06:00 US/Canada
			Central
			Subject: Re: [Go-essp-tech] Call for CA and OpenID Trust root
			Certificates
			 
			Hello Alex,
			 
			It's a good thing to bring up actually.  Each gateway that runs a CA
			gets to more or less specify their DN to be anything they want.
			Going
			forward, it's important to name them something more appropriate.  I
			agree that it doesn't look good to have GlobusTest in the DN as
			well (as
			we've discussed this before), so there are at least 2 options to
			consider here:
			 
			1) Allow everyone to get their gateway working as it is now (since
			it's
			not a functional thing, but a perception/cosmetic issue), or
			2) Request that everyone start over with their CAs in order to fix
			the
			DN*.
			 
			Maybe Gavin (actually, Eric if I'm following correctly) could
			describe
			how this step is done and whether or not it's automated away?  If
			it's
			automated and hidden from the user in the script, it's likely even
			starting over won't change anything for most people.
			 
			*This is something that can be done without replacing the entire
			gateway
			stack.  As a matter of fact, it's just a couple commands and then
			tracking the proper certificates from there.  If this second
			option is
			chosen, I can document what each Gateway needs to do in order to
			remedy
			the situation.
			 
			But I'd still like to know how this is done at the Gateway install
			time
			so that any NEW gateway installs won't have to do anything special
			and
			will have more valid looking (default) DNs.
			 
			Sound reasonable?
			 
			-Neill.
			 
			----- Original Message -----
			From: "Alex Sim" <asim at lbl.gov> <mailto:asim at lbl.gov> 
			To: neillm at mcs.anl.gov
			Cc: go-essp-tech at ucar.edu
			Sent: Friday, August 6, 2010 11:04:56 AM GMT -06:00 US/Canada
			Central
			Subject: Re: [Go-essp-tech] Call for CA and OpenID Trust root
			Certificates
			 
			I hate to bring this up again, but the DN format has to work out
			without GlobusTest in it.
			 
			-- Alex
			 
			 
			On 8/6/10 8:49 AM, neillm at mcs.anl.gov wrote:
			 

				Hello,
				 
				Thanks to everyone that has submitted their certificate
				information!
				 

			At the moment, I have a list of MyProxy and OpenID trusted
			certificates
			listed here:
			 

				http://*www.*ci.uchicago.edu/wiki/bin/view/ESGProject/ESGFederationTrust
				Roots
				 
				While this page is obviously not complete, please verify that the
				 

			certificates that you've sent appear in the listings.  I'd like to
			know
			roughly how many more I should be expecting before moving on to
			fill in
			the other details as well, so if you know you haven't sent yours
			in yet,
			please let me know (off-list is fine).
			 

				thanks,
				-Neill.
				 
				----- Original Message -----
				From: neillm at mcs.anl.gov
				To: go-essp-tech at ucar.edu
				Sent: Tuesday, August 3, 2010 10:58:29 AM GMT -06:00 US/Canada
				Central
				Subject: [Go-essp-tech] Call for CA and OpenID Trust root
				Certificates
				 
				Hello,
				 
				As discussed on the call just now, I need all OpenID trust root
				 

			certificates in addition to the hostname of the machine.
			 

				For anyone that has already submitted theirs (i.e. Luca, Phil), if
				 

			there are helpful commands that you can share with others, please
			do so
			in follow-up to this.
			 

				A helpful page that shows commands for working with your java
				 

			key/trust store is here:
			 

				http://*www.*sslshopper.com/article-most-common-java-keytool-keystore-co
				mmands.html
				 
				I also need everyone managing a MyProxy CA to send me their CA
				 

			certificates.  If you're running a MyProxy CA, there are 2 simple
			ways
			to find out which certs are needed (please pick one, not both):
			 

				1) Login to the MyProxy CA host and run "ls -al ~/.globus/
				simpleCA/"
				 

			as the user that runs the CA.
			 

				In this listing, you'll see a file called
				 

			"globus_simple_ca_XXXXXXXX_setup-0.20.tar.gz" where XXXXXXXX is a
			hash
			of the CA certificate.  Please send the files
			/etc/grid-security/certificates/XXXXXXXX.0 and
			/etc/grid-security/certificates/XXXXXXXX.signing_policy as well as
			the
			hostname of the CA machine.
			 

				2) Another method of finding which cert to send is to run the
				 

			"grid-default-ca" program:
			 

				--------------------------------------------------------------------
				$GLOBUS_LOCATION/bin/grid-default-ca
				 
				The available CA configurations installed on this host are:
				 
				Directory: /etc/grid-security/certificates
				 
				1) 0ba75d15 -
				/O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest2/OU=simpleCA-vm-125-66.ci.uchicago.edu/
				CN=Globus
				 

				Simple CA
				2) 1c3f2ca8 -  /DC=org/DC=DOEGrids/OU=Certificate
				Authorities/CN=DOEGrids CA 1
				3) 3de8c5e9 -
				/O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCA-vm-125-67.ci.uchicago.edu/
				CN=Globus
				Simple CA
				4) 519bfbae -
				/O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCA-vm-125-66.ci.uchicago.edu/
				CN=Globus
				Simple CA
				5) 6349a761 -  /O=DOE Science Grid/OU=Certificate
				Authorities/CN=Certificate Manager
				6) 9388e5cb -
				/O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCA-pcmdi3.llnl.gov/CN=Globus
				Simple CA
				7) 9d8753eb -  /DC=net/DC=es/OU=Certificate Authorities/OU=DOE
				Science
				 

				Grid/CN=pki1
				8) d1b603c3 -  /DC=net/DC=ES/O=ESnet/OU=Certificate
				Authorities/CN=ESnet Root CA 1
				9) ecdb249f -
				/O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCA-esgdev.ci.uchicago.edu/CN=Globus
				Simple CA
				 
				 
				The default CA is:
				 

			/O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest2/OU=simpleCA-vm-125-66.ci.uchicago.edu/
			CN=Globus
			Simple CA
			 

				       Location: /etc/grid-security/certificates/0ba75d15.0
				 
				Enter the index number of the CA to set as the default [q to quit]
				--------------------------------------------------------------------
				 
				To avoid changing anything, press "q" to quit.
				 
				Near the bottom, we are told which CA is currently our default.
				 

			Please send the file located at the listed "Location" in addition
			to the
			XXXXXXXX.signing_policy file located in the same directory.
			Please also
			send the DN listed with that file and the hostname of the CA
			machine.
			 

				IMPORTANT: For the MyProxy CA certificates, I need both the ".0"
				AND
				 

			the ".signing_policy" files together.  Please also send the
			machine's
			hostname.
			 

				-Neill.
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		--
		Estanislao Gonzalez
		 
		Max-Planck-Institut für Meteorologie (MPI-M)
		Deutsches Klimarechenzentrum (DKRZ) - German Climate Computing Centre
		Room 108 - Bundesstrasse 45a, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany
		 
		Phone:   +49 (40) 46 00 94-126
		E-Mail:  estanislao.gonzalez at zmaw.de
		 
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Rachana Ananthakrishnan
Argonne National Lab | University of Chicago
 
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-- 
Gavin M. Bell
Lawrence Livermore National Labs
--
 
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                     -Paul Saffo
 
(GPG Key - http://rainbow.llnl.gov/dist/keys/gavin.asc)
 
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