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(I had to edit my gaffs - just too embarrassing - too early for
me... need mountain dew i.v. drip stat.)<br>
<br>
On 4/20/11 10:04 AM, Gavin M. Bell wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:4DAF120C.2000805@llnl.gov" type="cite">
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Hi...<br>
<br>
On 4/20/11 8:13 AM, Don Middleton wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:D9CF70B2-8B68-4A6D-8E83-43946571CBB0@ucar.edu"
type="cite">Hi all - I thought we had group consensus yesterday
on the path forward. Also, going back to Eric's post - we worked
on this as a group quite a bit back in 2009, and from the wiki:
<div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family:
Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height:
17px;">
<blockquote type="cite">
<h4 style="line-height: normal; font-weight: bold;
padding: 0px; font-size: 13pt; margin: 25px 0px 4px;
color: rgb(0, 51, 102);">Basic Course of Events</h4>
<ul style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt;
list-style-type: disc;">
<li style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt; margin:
0px; padding: 0px;">The ESG Gateway authenticates with
a Datanode.</li>
<li style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt; margin:
0px; padding: 0px;">The ESG Gateway requests metrics
data from the Datanode for a specific time range.</li>
<li style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt; margin:
0px; padding: 0px;">The Datanode retrieves the metrics
data for the specific time range.</li>
<li style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt; margin:
0px; padding: 0px;">The Datanode returns the metric
data to the ESG Gateway</li>
<li style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 13pt; margin:
0px; padding: 0px;">The ESG Gateway persists the
returned metric data to its Database.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
</span>
<div>One of the hard requirements that drove this was the
ability to detect unwanted user behavior, know who that is,
disable them, and possibly take other action.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>cheers - don</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
You can still do this... The only difference is that you won't be
able to directly see that the rogue is say, "donmiddleton" you'll
know the rogue as "da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709". If
you need to know exactly that that value resolves to
"donmiddleton" you will know who to contact,
da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709's IDP (in the esg case,
the gateway), which is provided in the metrics report. This is
exactly the usage scenario as we do with email addresses. There
is no real difference with what the string is that identifies the
user as far as any of the system is concerned. The obfuscation
allows us to be a bit less intrusive. In this case, if I was a
malicious person, I could not be inspired to open a credit card
account in the name of Don Middleton because I saw it in the
metrics log. Most credit card companies would frown on giving a
card to da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709. There is
absolutely no functional reason to provide usernames in logs. As
I mentioned if you want to resolve this person then you can, that
additional step thwarts abuse and having us on the hook for
putting this unnecessary bit of information out there.
Furthermore the user put their trust in their chosen IDP to have
their information not in every metrics client in our system. There
still remains no cogent reason to put an individuals username or
openid out in the clear in metrics logs that are transferred on
the wire. I think it would be a positive thing to be able to make
the righteous claim that we don't expose our users to undo
information exposure. It is a good policy, prevents bias and
makes us look good and is the right thing to do. - win win win win<br>
<br>
If you want to be Big Brother, you can still block mischievous
da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709 from coming into your
system :-).<br>
<br>
You may want to re-examine what you are doing that is using
people's usernames/openids and why/if that is necessary. There
still doesn't seem to be any scenario that would NOT support this
simple 1:1 string replacement. IMHO.<br>
<br>
We will pilot it and see how you like it. fair enough?<br>
<br>
On the technical side it is pretty straight forward.<br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:D9CF70B2-8B68-4A6D-8E83-43946571CBB0@ucar.edu"
type="cite">
<div>
<div>
<div>On Apr 19, 2011, at 4:10 PM, Gavin M. Bell wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#ffffcc"> Hi Eric <br>
<br>
(comments below)<br>
<br>
On 4/19/11 1:46 PM, Eric Nienhouse wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:4DADF4AA.504@ucar.edu" type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Hi All,
We discussed the Data Node metrics access logging service in our GO-ESSP
call today. This is a key integration point between Gateways and Data
Nodes and is a high priority feature for the 1.3.0 release.
Following is a summary of our conclusions. Please note anything that
may be incorrect or unclear.
1) The Data Node metrics access logging service should be secured via SSL.
2) Gateway access to the metrics service should require (GW client)
authentication.
3) Email address should not be included in the metrics records exchanged.
</pre>
</blockquote>
nod<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:4DADF4AA.504@ucar.edu" type="cite">
<pre wrap="">4) There are a number of use cases which imply tracking user OpenID's
at the GW and DN.
</pre>
</blockquote>
I sill think that the openid's should be obfuscated.
The one bit of information in the openid that will be in
a different field will be the hostname value of the
user's openid i.e. their IDP. With that bit of
information there will be everything that one would need
in a metrics context. Thus you would be able to answer
the metrics question: How many people accessing Y data
have accounts on X? X being the IDP of an organization.<br>
<br>
I share Bob's and Philip's concern about data exposure.
In the scenario above, the openid of person Z can still
be positively gotten by asking idp X, 'hey who is Z?',
but this is not the general case. This also follows the
basic pattern that we employ for email addresses which
we all agree should not be passed around on the wire,
regardless of transfer mechanism. The pattern for email
is that we have to run a special resolution service in
order to perform the lookup, because that information is
not made directly available.<br>
<br>
So, the returned metrics would not have the openid but
have two bits of information:<br>
1 - the openid / userid hash<br>
2 - the hostname of the IDP for whom the openid is in
custody.<br>
<br>
I think this should be sufficient to provide reasonable
privacy regardless of using secured ssl or not.<br>
I cannot see a use case in the context of metrics that
require any additional information.<br>
Do you concur? <br>
<blockquote cite="mid:4DADF4AA.504@ucar.edu" type="cite">
<pre wrap="">We discussed providing examples or best practices for securing the
metrics service. (Ideally for a Non-Spring Tomcat environment.)
(Phil, Luca, Nate?)
We noted the Gateway 1.3.0 RC1 release is waiting on finalizing the
metrics service interface and security configuration. We need to
identify the time-line for accomplishing securing the metrics service.
(Gavin?)
For further background, the ESG Metrics Use Cases can be found below.
These Use Cases support our conclusions above.
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://wiki.ucar.edu/display/esgcet/Metrics">https://wiki.ucar.edu/display/esgcet/Metrics</a>
I appreciate all the input today.
Thanks,
-Eric
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</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Gavin M. Bell
Lawrence Livermore National Labs
--
"Never mistake a clear view for a short distance."
-Paul Saffo
(GPG Key - <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://rainbow.llnl.gov/dist/keys/gavin.asc">http://rainbow.llnl.gov/dist/keys/gavin.asc</a>)
A796 CE39 9C31 68A4 52A7 1F6B 66B7 B250 21D5 6D3E
</pre>
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</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Gavin M. Bell
Lawrence Livermore National Labs
--
"Never mistake a clear view for a short distance."
-Paul Saffo
(GPG Key - <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://rainbow.llnl.gov/dist/keys/gavin.asc">http://rainbow.llnl.gov/dist/keys/gavin.asc</a>)
A796 CE39 9C31 68A4 52A7 1F6B 66B7 B250 21D5 6D3E
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Gavin M. Bell
Lawrence Livermore National Labs
--
"Never mistake a clear view for a short distance."
-Paul Saffo
(GPG Key - <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://rainbow.llnl.gov/dist/keys/gavin.asc">http://rainbow.llnl.gov/dist/keys/gavin.asc</a>)
A796 CE39 9C31 68A4 52A7 1F6B 66B7 B250 21D5 6D3E
</pre>
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